Why Not Syria?

Earlier this year I wrote an essay about humanitarian intervention, and the competing legal, political and moral contributory factors. My conclusion was that considerations of a political nature carry far more weight than any other and that this largely explains the appearance of inconsistency in policy. Although relatively well received, the paper was criticised for not looking in more depth at NATO’s activity in Libya and, moreover, the interventions that didn’t happen in other parts of the Middle East.

The rebellions that occurred across the Middle East were met with varying degrees of government resistance and rapprochement, with significant concessions made in some countries and all out war waged against the civilian populations of others. Libya was where Western media attention was focussed but the Syrian, Yemeni and Bahraini regimes all employed (and are employing) tactics as violent and oppressive, if not moreso, than those of Qaḏḏāfī.

Although I did reference the action in passing, at the time it felt far too “live” an issue for any meaningful analysis or commentary. It probably still is but, without writing an essay on the subject, I thought it was worth looking at the political differences between Libya and the other countries in the region. Gross simplification of how international relations works coming up:

Syria

Intervention? Sanctions, no military action.

Why not?

1. Next door to Israel
2. Actually has Weapons of Mass Destruction
3. Exports from China to Syria worth upwards of $2billion
4. Russian investment in Syria valued at $19.1billion plus $1.1billion in exports (mostly military hardware).
5. Any action tabled would therefore fall victim to inevitable UNSC veto.

Yemen

Intervention? Condemnation of Saleh, no sanctions or threat of military action.

Why not?

1. No (recent) history of beef.
2. Scant media attention paid to the uprising – no public demands for intervention
3. Geographically isolated – no strategic interest.
4. Important battleground in the War on Terror – cooperating with the US.

Bahrain

Intervention? No condemnation, sanctions or military action.

Why not?

1. Closely allied with Saudi Arabia.
2. Host of the US Fifth Naval Fleet.
3. Buying its weapons off the US.

Saudi Arabia

Intervention? No chance.

Why not?

1. Uprising choked off before it could gain traction.
2. Media too tightly controlled to report freely and accurately on protests.
3. Close relationship with the US in combating Global War on Terror.
4. Supplies 19.5% of world oil reserves
5. Holds – along with the other oil exporters – 2.6% of US debt.
6. America’s best customer.

Libya

Intervention? NATO airstrikes.

Why?

1. Did not have Weapons of Mass Destruction.
2. Qaḏḏāfī no real asset in the war on terror.
3. No direct threat to Israel.
4. Supplies only 3% of world oil reserves.
5. The Arab League said intervention was fine by them - they didn’t really like Qaḏḏāfī anyway.
6. (Former) State sponsor of terrorism.

Ultimately, we intervened because we could. Qaḏḏāfi’s problem, more than anything, was that he had failed to make himself indispensable, either as a trade or security partner, to any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council or to his neighbours in the region.

It’s nothing personal, just politics.

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